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Abstract :  
 Modularization is a growing concept in auto industry. Architectural decisions had been many time studied 
from the car maker’s point of view. This article addresses the question of supplier’s strategy in the modular 
business. A prior publication (Fourcade Midler 2004) showed that supplier’s involvement could take 
various forms, from light coordination to heavy investment in deep module redesign. This article will 
investigate how these different modular involvement profile could fit in general 1st Tier supplier’s strategy.  
 
It is based both on a general study of automotive suppliers industrial field and an interactive research that 
we have been pursuing in conjunction with one 1st Tier supplier  since 2001. 
 
The first part of the article assesses the development of modular ranges by 1st Tier Suppliers. In its first 
section, we examine how, in the company we studied from 1995 to 2003, the modules in question evolved 
from a local market opportunity to an issue of strategic importance for the business. In section 2, in line 
with the resource theory pattern, we show how the Sysmod success story is deeply connected to a dynamic 
capabilities creation process. In the third section, we extend our analysis to all players that have performed 
an important role in the emergence of automobile modules. We will show that three types of suppliers has 
been players in the modularity development : industrial service providers, automobile-product-centred 
suppliers and functional-component specialists. In 2003, only the last two types remain as important 
module players. Is it structural or conjonctural ? How modularity fit with the general strategic patterns of 
these three types ? 
 
The second part will try to answer these questions. In the first section, we will review the principal 
approaches on theorizing the automotive suppliers’ strategies. In the second section, returning to our 
earlier typology, we shall precise the four different modular involvement profiles in term of both value 
creation and resources invested. Then, we will assess  the extent to which these different profiles fit with 
general strategic pattern for 1st Tier Suppliers and discuss the possible strategic dynamics of the actual 
module players.  
 
The results of this analysis led us to the following principal conclusions. It explains the initial dynamics of 
the market, with some players quickly dropping out of the frame while two types of company whose general 
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strategies are nevertheless very different have managed to survive. It  shows the necessity of combining 
module redesign involvement profile while constructing learning externalities that can be redeployed on 
other project and on other OEM. It  shows that companies of both types are capable of lasting the course, 
in accordance with two trajectories that link general strategies and module strategies in a coherent 
manner. It validates the relevance of theoretical models that emphasize the resource construction dynamic 
over more static strategic models.  
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Introduction  
 
Although the idea of modular architecture is a long-established one in the world of electronics and 
information technology, it has only recently begun to make headway in automobile manufacturing, where 
the end product is physically and functionally far more integrated than, for example, a desktop computer. 
However, the industry craze for modularization that took off in the mid-90s was followed by a wave of 
disillusionment: manufacturers that had seen in this architectural innovation the opportunity for significant 
advances in performance in terms of both costs and functional performance were often disappointed by the 
poor margins generated by the products, while suppliers that saw modularity as a new El Dorado have often 
been rewarded with a spectacular increase in the workload and the costs involved in the creation of modular 
ranges.  
 
It is against this background that our study of modularization in the automobile sector, undertaken in 2001, 
unfolds. The first stage of our study led us to two important findings [1]  . 
 
The first finding involves the importance of the role of the 1st Tier Suppliers in the development of 
modular automobile products. Most prior research has addressed the issue from the perspective of the 
manufacturer[2, 3]; and, while the final decision on the overall design of its product does lie with the latter, 
achieving significant advances in performance (in terms of both function and costs) largely depends on the 
way 1st Tier Suppliers propose, and are capable of addressing, this opportunity. Early experience forms the 
basis for subsequent expectations with regard to the new strategy and is a determining factor in later 
developments, which is why our research centred on the modular strategies adopted by 1st Tier Suppliers. 
 
The second finding concerns the variety of levels and ways in which 1st Tier Suppliers are involved in 
modular strategies. Our analysis of various cases of modularization revealed a wide variety of approaches. 
We also found that only configurations that closely associated modularization with significant innovation 
around the perimeter could last the course in a "win-win" trajectory for both manufacturer and 1st Tier 
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Suppliers, and such configurations depend on a set of significant conditions being met in terms of resources 
allocated, the internal structure of the 1st Tier Suppliers, and its relationship with the manufacturer.  
 
All this raises the question of how much weight modularization really has in the strategy of 1st Tier 
Suppliers. This is the objective that we address in this article in light of the interactive research that we 
have been pursuing in conjunction with one 1st Tier supplier  since 2001. 
 
This article is structured in two parts:  
 
The first assesses the development of modular ranges by 1st Tier Suppliers. In its first section, we examine 
how, in the company we studied from 1995 to 2003, the modules in question evolved from a local market 
opportunity to an issue of strategic importance for the business. In section 2 , we show how the Sysmod 
success story is deeply connected to a dynamic capabilities creation process. In the third section, we extend 
our analysis to all players that have performed an important role in the emergence of automobile modules. 
We will show that three types of suppliers has been players in the modularity development : industrial 
service providers, automobile-product-centred suppliers and functional-component specialists. In 2003, 
only the last two types remain as important module players. Is this diversity in players’ profile structural or 
conjonctural ? How does modularity fit with the general strategic patterns of these three types ? 
 
The second part will try to answer these questions. In the first section, we will review the principal 
approaches on theorizing the automotive suppliers’ strategies. In the second section, returning to our earlier 
typology [1], we shall precise the four different modular involvement profiles in term of both value creation 
and resources invested. Then, we will assess  the extent to which these different profiles fit with general 
strategic pattern for 1st Tier Suppliers and discuss the possible strategic dynamics of the actual module 
players.  
 
The results of this analysis led us to the following principal conclusions: 
 
- It explains the initial dynamics of the market, with some players quickly dropping out of the frame 
while two types of company whose general strategies are nevertheless very different have 
managed to survive. 
- It  shows the necessity of combining module redesign  while constructing learning externalities 
that can be redeployed on other project and on other OEM. 
- It  shows that companies of both types are capable of lasting the course, in accordance with two 
trajectories that link general strategies and module strategies in a coherent manner.  
- It validates the relevance of theoretical models that emphasize the resource construction dynamic 
over more static strategic models.  
 
Part one: the development of module offers by 1st  Tier Suppliers 
1. From market opportunity to strategic factor: the history of Sysmod's module division  
 
- The 93-98 period: a minimum-cost approach in preparation for the emerging module market 
 
The point of departure for Sysmod's adventure in the modularization of front faces for automobiles was in 
1993, when the company recruited a trainee industrial designer. At the time, Sysmod2 was producing such 
heat-exchange components as radiators, condensers, charge air coolers, oil coolers, and so on. Another 
branch of Sysmod made front lighting assemblies, while still another made hood latch mechanisms. In 
keeping with the traditional strategy of automobile 1st Tier Suppliers – which involves absorbing the ever-
increasing outsourcing demands of the manufacturers – the trainee was given the job of thinking up a way 
of cleverly integrating all these elements with different functions (cooling, lighting, etc.) and of looking 
into the technological possibility of designing a central "support" piece upon which all Sysmod components 
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from the same geographical perimeter might perhaps one day be fitted. It's important to note that, at the 
time, Sysmod was not a pioneer but rather a follower where this approach was concerned: one 
manufacturer was already making, via its longstanding equipment supplier, such subassemblies, called 
front-face modules. The challenge facing Sysmod, therefore, was to gain credibility not in functional know-
how but in its ability to integrate, in a single vehicle, components that, for a large part, were not part of 
Sysmod's core business. This meant that the company needed to acquire fresh competence. After examining 
the issue, Sysmod began to present its work to manufacturers, which, little by little, began to consider 
Sysmod a credible partner, until Sysmod was contending, by 1996, for the first contracts for front-face 
modules on a full perimeter, including Sysmod components, certainly, but also others, such as bumper 
beams, painted cowls, and canisters for windshield and headlight washer fluid. A further difficulty was that 
these modules had to be made in "just-in-time" sequenced mode,3 meaning that a new skills set had to be 
acquired by Sysmod, whose core business was in components that, by their nature, had never presented the 
company with this particular logistical challenge, so here again fresh proficiency was needed. The company 
enlisted the help of consulting firms to draft and present its first tenders to manufacturers.  
 
As more and more contracts went up for bid, Sysmod stepped up its research activity on this new market, 
and in 1997 two project managers were appointed, one with a background in sales from its lighting 
operation and the other from cooling, with a background in R&D. Their mission was to understand and 
expand the market. They were allocated a budget, and were later joined by a three-person design team 
whose job was to devise the modules. Late in 1997, one of Sysmod's lighting divisions was approached by 
a manufacturer with a question: "We have a space shortage in our factory; would you be willing to deliver a 
front-face module?" Sysmod's answer was yes. Shortly afterward, and for the same reasons, Sysmod won a 
further contract in a different country. These were small projects in terms of volume4, with Sysmod’s input 
limited to assembly and logistics, but they gave a significant boost to the company’s learning curve.  
 
Until then, Sysmod's management had been content to merely observe as this store of competence 
gradually grew. The team in charge of modularization operated on the fringes of the company's core 
business and was supported financially by the operational unit in charge of developing sales of thermal 
exchangers.  
 
 
- The 1998–2002 period: from theory to practice, the market puts Sysmod to the test 
 
The leap that brought an end to this early phase in the history of Sysmod's front-face module operations 
came on 15 October 1998 with the awarding by a manufacturer (after several preliminary orders) of a 
contract for one million front faces per year, to be delivered to four different countries. On 21 October 1998 
there followed a presentation to the president of the Sysmod group, and on 2 November 1998 a module 
division was created. Such a division was essential if the modular team was to gain any credibility within 
the Sysmod organization – at Sysmod, "division" means "separate account", and the economic realities 
behind the contract could therefore be quantified in detail now. 
 
The next step was to create teams, acquire competence and tools, and so on. Pending the arrival of 
reinforcements, it was all the initial team members could do to hold things together. Support came in the 
form of a wave of long-term trainees5 with backgrounds in sourcing and industry. During what became a 
most rewarding period, the core Sysmod team was able to gain the credibility and time it needed to acquire 
further competence. It was with this first contract that Sysmod won the standing it needed to move up, in 
the estimation of another manufacturer, from a potential second-tier component supplier to the status of 
partner as part of a joint venture with an 1st Tier Suppliers specializing in injected components (structural 
and stylistic), in the process winning a second and then a third contract in the same year (1999). Three 
                                                 
3 Delivery in sequenced just-in-time mode requires that modules be delivered in the order in which vehicles travel down the assembly 
line. Manufacturers decide upon this order only an hour before the vehicles arrive on the line for assembly; this creates a certain 
tension all along the supply chain established by the module supplier.  
4 Between 100 and 150 vehicles per day, compared to over 1,000 per day for high-volume projects. 
 
5 Six to eight months. 
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years later in 2002, the three projects – launched one after the other – gave Sysmod a spot in the world 
ranking for front-face module supply. The company now had about 200 people deployed on 
modularization, one-third of whom were working on the design for a new front-face module. 
 
At this point in the story, the management of Sysmod decided to take stock. The fact was that, although the 
evident commercial success of the venture had considerably outstripped initial expectations, the 
management of Sysmod expressed strong reservations about further development in this area of activity. 
There were several reasons for this view: one was the amount of money consumed by the new division, and 
then there was the fact that the division made no significant contribution to the expansion of Sysmod's 
component business; rather, it functioned as a mere outpost of the company’s long-term core concern. 
These issues found concrete expression in the form of such recurrent questions as, "What shall we do with 
this area?" and, more to the point, "What happens if we close it down?" With each new contract that went 
up for tender, the doubts of Sysmod's management persisted. It was thanks to the astuteness and tenacity of 
its teams that the modular concept survived until, finally – powerless before the commercial success of this 
“intrapreneurial” division, which had always remained on the margins of its operations – strategic 
imperatives forced Sysmod to take a stand on the future of the undertaking.  
 
The question now facing the company was this: Is this success contingent upon a perimeter/team/market, or 
is it in fact a new strategic paradigm? How was Sysmod management to make sense of it all?  
 
2.  The Sysmod story as a typical dynamic capabilities creation case 
 
To support the idea that Sysmod involvement in Module was more than a market opportunity but a real 
strategic turn, we will analyse how the firm built strong competencies through a dynamic capability 
creation process, in line with the resource-based view [4, 5] [6]. As Samsung could grow from nothing to a 
35% market share in the semi conductor business [7] building strong competencies through a dynamic 
capability creation, we will try to describe how Sysmod has come to build module supplier capabilities that 
permit to be a major player in the field, coming from component specialist background. The dynamic 
capabilities are defined by Eisenhardt and Martin [8] as “a set of specific and identifiable processes such as 
product development , strategic decision making and alliancing”. Without making any claims to an 
exhaustive study, we can still group this competence into six subsets: logistical competence, R&D 
competence (products and projects), value creation models, knowledge of the client's operations, 
organizational challenges for the 1st Tier Suppliers, and reconfiguration challenge through the supply 
chain.  
 
Logistical competence 
  
In four years, Sysmod put together a production base of six advanced manufacturing facilities in six 
different countries, the smaller plants producing 150 front-face modules every day and the larger ones 
producing 2000 per day. Sysmod has now established itself as a credible 1st Tier Suppliers in the 
production of modules in sequenced just-in-time mode. This competence is not revolutionary in the 
automobile sector – 1st Tier Suppliers making large, highly-diversified components had faced the same 
problem before, and had duly created the competence they needed. It was new for Sysmod, however, as its 
core business products were delivered directly from inventory, with no need to acquire this new skill. In 
1998, Sysmod lost out on more than one contract because it lacked this competence. One of the inputs 
provided by Sysmod's partner company in a contract won as a joint venture in 1998 was in fact the ability 
to work in just-in-time mode. Sysmod's front-face module division is now autonomous in this field, with an 
internally developed information system that has already attracted interest beyond the frontiers of the 
Sysmod group.  
 
R&D competence 
  
As it learned more about the development of modules, new job functions opened up for Sysmod – the job 
of module architect, for example, which had not previously figured in Sysmod's core competence. As the 
module architect is in charge of all components within the module perimeter, s/he needs to work hand in 
hand with the manufacturer in the architecture of the module. 
  6 
 
As the front-face module division was responsible for designing the interfaces between the various 
components and for co-designing6 the interfaces between module and vehicle, it had to gain an 
understanding of, for example, what a vehicle chassis is and how it works, or a bumper beam, or painted 
cowl7. This new component competence has now been taken on board. In our opinion, it's important to note 
here that it was the "naiveté" of this Sysmod division that enabled it to come up with innovative ideas on 
components outside the traditional domain of Sysmod. It appears important, as explained by Brusoni & 
Prencipe [9] to extend the perimeter of knowledge beyond what is strictly necessary within the company's 
perimeter of production. Sysmod's teams are now able to propose an innovative re-segmenting of the 
product, offering new advantages in terms of technical performance.  
 
New value creation models 
  
In its development, the Front end module division had to formulate, settle and promote inside Sysmod as 
inside its customers new models for value creation on the modular scope, that renewed and often conflicted 
the two classical value drivers in the component business : systems optimization and standardization.  
 
The systems orientation focus on functions, while the modules specialist must secure geographic 
rationalization without affecting (and preferably improving) functional optimization. One cannot exist 
without the other. But system approach has a longer history in industry than Modules, as within the 
component suppliers as within OEM. Then, owing to the way manufacturers select their module supplier or 
suppliers, this optimization is now managed in sequential fashion. Functions are optimized first and the 
architecture of module components second. In fact, when a module supplier wishes to create value by re-
examining this or that technical choice made by the systems specialist, the latter will explain that it's 
already too late. 
 
The added value provided by the module specialist, from the point of view of the 1st Tier Suppliers, lies in 
the optimization of each component's architecture. Manufacturers may also see modularization as a way to 
promote the standardization of vehicles [10]. Therefore, the 1st Tier Suppliers are likely to look 
unfavourably on the standardization of components imposed by the manufacturer. A classic case, which 
affects nearly all manufacturers, is that of hood latch mechanisms. Every manufacturer wants to optimize 
the cost of this component via the volume effect. Our observation on the ground has revealed situations 
where the cost of interfacing this standard component with the chassis is three times higher than the cost of 
the component itself. If we multiply this extra cost by one million units per year, we may well ask ourselves 
whether the gains achieved through standardization were worth the effort.  
 
 
Knowledge of the client's operations 
  
Here, the first task facing Sysmod was to re-cast its customer relationship structure, for manufacturers did 
not buy their front-face modules through the same channels used for the traditional functions of Sysmod. 
This task in turn entailed another type of learning. Let's take the front-face module as an example again. 
This module comprises an average of 30 individual components, from larger elements such as the bumper 
beam and the radiator to smaller parts such as warning lights and attachments. Most automobile 
manufacturers are organized according to a functional logic – the cooling-systems function has its own 
designer and its own buyer, shock absorbers their own designer and buyer, and so on. Not only this, but 
other elements of the manufacturer's organization are important, too. Take architects for instance: there are 
architects of the under-hood engine environment and architects for external elements. To our knowledge, 
even the manufacturers that are most advanced in matters of modularization have not modified their 
interface with the 1st Tier Suppliers – or, where they have, the changes are no more than superficial. The 
1st Tier Suppliers therefore finds itself forced to act as coordinator for its client, a difficult role to play 
when you're not integrated into the manufacturer's organization. In practice, it means a lot of time spent on 
making decisions. For example, it took over two months for a manufacturer's manager in charge of liaison 
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with the module supplier to sign an agreement for a lock mechanism because there were so many decision-
makers were involved. All in all, Sysmod's early experiments in module development gave it considerable 
insight into how its clients function. 
 
Furthermore, as an illustration of the extent of contingency involved in module production, we can identify 
different client types using the "delegation of responsibility" variable. Sysmod has worked with 
manufacturers that relieve the 1st Tier Suppliers of all responsibility in the design of the module, seeing the 
module supplier merely as an assembler and logistician. At the other end of the scale, Sysmod has also 
worked with manufacturers which demand that their 1st Tier Suppliers take total responsibility for the 
design of the module, the choice of supplier, and so on.  
 
Organizational challenges for the 1st Tier Suppliers  
 
Over the years, 1st Tier Suppliers have shaped their organization to create an efficient interface with the 
manufacturer. Like the manufacturers, most 1st Tier Suppliers – Sysmod, for one – are organized in terms 
of functional product lines. We can therefore understand why, as happens with the clients, a division whose 
job is to optimize module architecture should also have to multiply internal channels of communication as 
required by the number of different functions resident on the developed module. In short, the team in 
charge of developing the modules on an internal basis encounters the same difficulties as those faced by the 
manufacturer. And as with the manufacturers, cross-cutting concepts find it hard to survive, either because 
they're drowned at birth by counter-concepts (systems, standardization, or economic optimization of the 
component to the detriment of the system for profit-centre reasons), or because, since they span various 
divisions, they fail to find an internal sponsor.  
 
Reconfiguration challenge through the supply chain.  
Sysmod's front-face module division learned the hard way how to appreciate the difficulties inherent in 
each component, but with regard to relationships with joint venture partners and Tier-2 suppliers, the 
thorniest issue of all was the war to secure a superior position on the value chain. On every occasion where 
the manufacturer has failed to clearly indicate who is in charge of whom, difficulties have emerged and 
have had a serious impact on product quality, with the resulting deterioration in the innovative content of 
the product limiting the financial gains from the contract8. The challenge here is to hold on to the privileged 
position of Tier-1 supplier. Even if many Tier-2 suppliers are doing very well, some Tier-1 suppliers for a 
conventional architecture are reluctant to be downgraded to a Tier-2 position by a module supplier. What 
this signifies in practice is internecine warfare among 1st Tier Suppliers, with reductions of sale prices and 
therefore of margins. During the project, there occur a succession of short-circuits caused, to a greater or 
lesser extent, by the manufacturer. Sysmod therefore sounded out its rivals and potential partners in an 
attempt to map the strategic positioning intentions of each one, and four years on, it has sealed a number of 
partnerships with regard to these modules9. 
 
3. Leading 1st Tier Suppliers in automobile modularization 
 
Let us now extend our analysis to the other suppliers that entered modularity. The automotive supplier 
sector in its previous structuration was already fiercely competitive when studied by Porter ([11],[12], and 
the players – and sysmod among them – firstly saw the emerging module market as a new differentiation 
niche for high advanced suppliers. But rapidly the surprise – and disillusion – was big, as a large variety of 
players succeeded to enter the business, creating very rapidly an exacerbated the degree of competition.  
 
When characterizing the suppliers which involved in the module business, the research identified three 
types of 1st Tier Suppliers  considering the offers provided to manufacturer.  
 
                                                 
8 As we will see, the contract’s precarious profitability was, in our opinion, directly linked to the degree of innovation in the module 
that was developed. Without innovation, there could be little profitability.  
9 Examples includes Expert Components, acquired by Venture/Peguform; Hella’s joint venture with Behr to construct front faces, 
sometimes with the participation of Magna; Kansei’s joint-venture with Calsonic to make front-face modules and cockpits; Denso and 
Magnetti-Marelli; and so on.  
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Industrial service providers 
 
These 1st Tier Suppliers are module manufacturers in the most restrictive sense of the term, i.e. a physical 
grouping of components assembled and sold as a single product. In the early days of moduling, some 
manufacturers turned to this type of 1st Tier Suppliers, which won significant market share by making use 
of competence in just-in-time sequenced delivery that they had gained in producing large, diversified 
components such as seats and cowls. This arrangement suited the manufacturers perfectly as there was no 
need for them to modify their component purchasing policy: the industrial service providers bought the 
components where the manufacturers told them to buy, at the price set.  
 
Automobile-product-centred 1st Tier Suppliers 
 
These 1st Tier Suppliers are now leading players in the modules sector. Their backgrounds are in 
processing activities such as sheet metal and plastics. The 1st Tier Suppliers of this type that have not 
become trapped in a single area of materials-processing competence have extended their skills to more 
technically-demanding products such as structural vehicle parts and styling elements. Components of this 
complexity require these 1st Tier Suppliers to understand the general constraints affecting the automobile 
product (limitations regarding safety and style). Not only were these components complex, they were also 
bulky, which forced 1st Tier Suppliers to develop the skills necessary to produce according to just-in-time 
sequenced requirements.  
 
Historically, the size of these components and the diversity imposed by the number of colours involved 
(sometimes more than 40) has forced these 1st Tier Suppliers, for stock-rotation reasons, to set up next door 
to the manufacturers' assembly plants. We should note that, to preserve the ability to deliver to several 
manufacturers from the same factory, these 1st Tier Suppliers have refused, whenever possible, to install 
heavy equipment (injection presses, hot-stamp presses, and cutting gear) on the premises of the 
manufacturers; instead, they've worked with the manufacturers to create supplier parks where they could 
perform operations, such as sequencing of painted components using local stock, at a low capital cost. The 
same phenomenon can be observed in the production of fuel tanks and vehicle seating. Process specialists 
therefore contributed to the creation of supplier parks long before the emergence of the modules era. Once 
they had located to these supplier parks, these process specialists tried to diversify into as many tasks as 
possible in their efforts to improve returns on their investment in proximity production facilities. They 
therefore sought to install as many small components as possible (fog-lamps, ultrasound sensors, wiring, 
clips, and screws) in the parts they supply. Their next move was inspection services for quality of 
appearance, or for connectors and wiring. Their status as assembly-plant insiders brought them closer to 
their clients, and therefore they were better able to anticipate their clients' needs. Their strategy went 
beyond component sales to encompass component-related services: assembly (there are some 25 
components installed in a painted cowl alone), just-in-time delivery, quality control, management and 
administration of defects for which Tier-2 suppliers are responsible, and more. These extremely complex 
products were really modules before the term even existed. With their experience in assembly operations 
and their proximity to the assembly lines, these 1st Tier Suppliers began to understand how designs could 
be changed to make assembly easier, to manage stoppages better, and to appreciate how details of clearance 
and flushing could improve visual appearance. And so, little by little, they edged toward possession of a 
key area of competence in the module market: that of architect. 
 
These 1st Tier Suppliers, which we designate here as "product-centred", offered their clients more than 
industrial service providers could, and based their strategic positioning on their ability to rise to the 
challenges posed by the production of technically difficult parts where appearance is of the essence. By 
combining industrial with technical aspects, these 1st Tier Suppliers effectively became module suppliers.  
 
Functional and component specialists  
 
This is the third type of 1st Tier Suppliers on the module market. These 1st Tier Suppliers possess 
competence in certain components deemed critical within the perimeter of the module in question. 
Component specialists (of which Sysmod is one) are 1st Tier Suppliers that owe their place on the module 
market to their ability to provide a significant proportion of the components comprised in the module from 
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their own product range. This proportion can, in some cases, be over 80% in terms of the value of the 
components. It's their in-depth competence in modular components, therefore, that allows them to set their 
sights on developing the product architecture.  
 
The overall strategy of component specialists has been to concentrate the means of production to a 
maximum and to standardize products as much as possible, with only the installation interfaces of the 
components being custom-built. A single product may run to a production level of 11 million units per 
year, and this makes economies of scale possible. But while these savings have made the economic model 
followed by these 1st Tier Suppliers a lasting one, competition has grown tougher. For the last 10 years 
now, component specialist 1st Tier Suppliers have sought a way out of the mutually destructive scenario of 
a price war by looking to technological innovation as a way of ensuring cost reduction without putting a 
squeeze on margins. This strategy has allowed them to survive, but other strategic levers must now be 
found. Benefiting from the "de-verticalization" policies of manufacturers, one strategy has been to look 
beyond components to the functional perimeter, designing and offering what we now call systems; for 
instance, moving from A/C condensers to the full loop, including compressor, tubing, and electronics.  
 
Such a situation raises many questions concerning strategic issues of Supplier involvement in 
modularization: what is the rationale behind such common interest from supplier with so different 
businesses ? In 2003, when analysing OEM suppliers’ panel for module request for quotation, the 
remaining players are only the product-centred and component-function specialists. Has the modular 
business now reached a mature situation, based on stable trends or can we forecast new evolutions ? If not, 
how can we characterize the strategic rationalities of the remaining players ? Part two of this article will try 
to answer these questions. 
 
Part two: module involvement and the general strategy of 1st Tier Suppliers  
 
1. Strategic patterns for 1st Tier Suppliers: learning from history and literature 
 
The 1990s has seen deep transformations in suppliers-OEM relations, from classical market to more 
integrated partnership. The literature had largely developed the strategic rationalities behind such 
transformations  from the OEM point of view[13]. They lie in enhancement in product development and 
innovation performances (Clark and Fujimoto, 1987, [14]Midler 1994[15, 16], Garel Midler 1997, 
Segrestin, 2003)[17], transaction cost reductions (Williamson, 1975[Williamson, 1975 #155], Baudry, 
1991), share of sunk investments (Teece, 1986) and principal-agent control (Baudry, 1991).  
The supplier’s side of strategy has been more recently covered (Lamming, 1993[18], Kesseler, 1996 [19] , 
Donada 1997[20], Garel, Midler 1998 [16], Lenfle Midler, 2001[21], Lemasson Weil 2002[22]), as the 
supplier firms had to react to their clients’ deep and rapid strategic moves: why and to what point to involve 
in such new partnership relations, which were related to far heavier investments and strategic choices ? We 
shall resume the argumentation in the following points.  
- Considering the ongoing dynamics of the Auto industry, confronted more and more to intensive 
innovation context, there are no more doubts about partnership efficiency to generate value. In that 
context, resource theory (Kogut 1988, Hamel 1991) will suggest the supplier to be involved in 
these risky relations, because of the valuable learning that will come out of it.  
- The theory on power-dependance in vertical trade relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 
Buchanan, 1992) demonstrate the importance of initial conditions of relationship to the final share 
of outcomes between the players.  
-  This leads to a classical strategic question that all automobile 1st Tier Suppliers must grapple 
with: Is it better to respond to the demands of the client or to anticipate them? This is a classic 
question in the strategic management debate [23]: the problem lies in deciding whether the 
company should first seek to innovate by offering new solutions ("innovation orientation") or 
whether its first move should be to identify the needs of the client and develop its products 
accordingly ("customer orientation"). Customer orientation, as demonstrated by Christensen and 
Bower [24], can entail the loss of larger clients; the adoption of an innovation-oriented strategy as 
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a complement to customer orientation therefore becomes vital (Kesseler 98)[25].  We could call 
this the customer / innovation orientation dilemma. 
 Lamming [18]propose a interesting answer the innovation/customer orientation dilemma for 1st tier 
suppliers. He suggests that two strategies are viable.  
- The "loyal partner" accept the dominance of the client and remains faithful to its customer 
orientation strategy. He develops flexibility in the face of the diversified demands of the 
automobile manufacturers. It strives to answer yes to technical challenges, even if it means taking 
risks. Its internal organization brings it into close proximity with its clients, with the resulting 
intimacy raising a strong barrier against the entry of competitors that do not have this 
understanding of the client. Similarly, on the industrial plane, its attempts to forge an ever stronger 
relationship with its clients leads it to locate near as many manufacturer plants as possible and to 
offer as many services as possible from its installed base. 
-  On the contrary the "key partner" that seeks to influence the technology decisions of the client by 
occupying a key position. He also builds strategic barriers against incursions by rival companies, 
but on a different level: it's the technical excellence of its components and its extensive capacity 
for innovation – coupled with a strong patent-filing policy – that make this kind of 1st Tier 
Suppliers indispensable in the eyes of its manufacturer client. 
Donada [20] describes the success factors and the traps awaiting these two strategies. The key common trap 
is to invest too much in investments that the supplier cannot redeploy, the “loyal partner” because he is 
trapped in the singularities of its customer ; the “key partner” because he cannot impose its customers the 
protected breakthrough he developed.  
How do modular decisions fit in these strategic perspectives ? 
 
 
 
2. A typology of modular involvement profiles  
 
Before addressing this question, a prior result of our research was to demonstrate that supplier’s modular 
involvement needed to be more precisely characterized than a go/no go decision. Fourcade Midler (2004) 
[1] formalized four different modular involvement profiles for 1st Tier Suppliers, considering  the value 
targets addressed as the conditions for success associated with each one.  
 
 
Figure 1: A typology of modular involvement profiles for first-tier suppliers  
(source : Fourcade, Midler 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The market power profile (1) is a defensive approach whereby the company contends for contracts solely to 
lock in its position as a privileged partner of the manufacturer and to increase market share for the 
components incorporated into the module.  
 
The specialization profile (2) is based on the fact that the new component perimeter opened up by the 
modular concept can generate economic gains through the optimization of assembly and logistical metrics, 
 
Value created for both Tier 1 suppliers & OEMs
(4) External learning 
(3) Product redesign
 
(2) specialisation 
(1) market power
 Product and 
organization
    modification intensity 
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an optimization which the 1st Tier Suppliers is more capable of carrying out than the manufacturer, which 
is less specialized on a restricted perimeter. At no point is the product itself modified.  
 
In the product redesign profile (3), the 1st Tier Suppliers generate value by a deep redesign of the inside of 
the module, from a simple aggregation of component functional requirements and inside architecture given 
by OEM.  
 
The fourth modular strategy, external learning, has its rationale in what the company can learn and transfer 
elsewhere within its other offers provided: transform components to develop their contribution to future 
modular products, anticipate break through on technologies that favour module innovations. 
 
These profiles are tightly related to success conditions, in terms of the nature of the resources mobilized, 
internal processes, and contacts with manufacturing clients. We have shown [Fourcade-Midler, 2004 #69] 
that the disappointments encountered in recent moduling projects derived, in very general terms, from a 
mismatch between the chosen profile for the creation of value and the conditions intrinsic to the situation. 
To ensure that these conditions are firmly in place, we need to examine the wider strategy pursued by the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The setting up conditions associated to modular involvement profile 
(source : Fourcade, Midler 2004) 
 
We see that these associated conditions can be expressed in the strategy vocabulary in term of resources, 
customer orientation, and internal organization. 
3. Discussing the value creation/profit share dilemma of modular involvement profiles 
 
We can now characterise the different modular involvement profile in our strategic pattern that crosses the 
global value performance and the customer trap risk 
 
Value created for OEM & Tier 1
(4) External  Learning
(2) Specialisation 
(1) Market Power
Bargaining Competency Cost Killer Competency Early 1st Tier  selection 
Legal issues
Performance  Appraisal tool 
OE & T1 internal Org. 
OE /T1 project interface
Delegation of responsibilty
Car Architecture competency 
Improving across 
Business Unit  
communication 
(3) Product re-design 
Product and organization modification intensity
Associated conditions  for OEMs & Tier 1 suppliers
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                        Value performance vs 
Non deployability - Trap Risk 
- + 
- (1), (2) (4) 
+  (3) 
 
 
First and second profiles create poor value and low risk. They can typically contribute to a “loyal partner” 
supplier type. But these profile are not sustainable on the long term, for the value performance is too feeble 
to meet customer as suppliers need for profitability. 
 
Profile (3) is interesting for OEM but problematic for the supplier. The investment is particularly heavy for 
them, and its transferability is problematic for two reasons. First, the risk is high that value of a global 
redesign of the module will be captured by the OEM in its following products, with poor effects on 
investment profitability for supplier. Second, the possibility to transfer the solution to other range of 
product or customer is also feeble. The dynamic of auto architectures are rather unpredictable: on the 
contrary of  computer domain where platforms are no more proprietary, where the industry is driven by the 
self fulfilled prevision of Moore’s Law and a permanent bargaining of stabilizing standards by the platform 
leaders (Gawer 2000) [26]. In the auto industry on the contrary, architectural solutions are tightly product 
contingent (it is an integer product” in Fujimoto’s terms [27] because the advantages of standardisation is 
clearly counterbalance by a heavy disadvantage in terms of global product performances, differentiation 
and innovation tracks (see Fourcade Midler 2004)[1]. Therefore, the interfaces and design rules [28] are not 
well stabilised, and consequently, as pointed out by Chesbrough & Kusunoni, (2001, # 36)[29] this is a 
typical high customer trap risk situation for the 1st Tier Supplier implementing a “loyal partner” strategy. 
 
Profile (4) answers the risk identified in profile (3). External learning is the way 1st Tier suppliers can avoid 
the product/customer contingency trap by embedding module design investment in supplier’s private 
“undeconstructable” resources or competencies that can be redeploy and valued elsewhere. Using external 
learning as a springboard into the modules sector is tantamount to saying, "The value of the module is 
outside the module." 1st Tier Suppliers pursuing this strategy will seek to establish a learning node that can 
quickly incubate new knowledge, which can be mobilized elsewhere in the 1st Tier Suppliers's supply 
portfolio to create new components as solutions to the problems detected during the course of work on the 
modules. For example, aluminium radiators absorb hardly any shock in a frontal collision. The 1st Tier 
Suppliers supplying the radiators might discover this drawback during its work on the module, and devise a 
radiator whose job is not only to cool the engine but also to act as a shock absorber in the event of collision. 
This is one example of positive external learning 
 
Such a result put in question the Lamming dual strategy model, when implemented on the modular domain. 
On one side, pure “loyal partner” strategy appears non viable on the long term, (poor value creation or too 
risky when the industry is in high innovative period as now). Pure stand alone “key partner” strategy seems 
also non realist, as external learning is deeply dependant of supplier’s involvement in product/customer 
contingent module redesign. Profile (4) is an extension of profile (3). Hybridation of strategies appears as a 
necessity to maintain the modularity trend alive in auto industry. 
 
4. Why do suppliers go, quit or remain modular ?   
 
Lets us now interpret the ongoing situation of 1st Tier Suppliers on the automobile module market with the 
help of these strategic reasoning. We saw in part one that three different types of 1st tier Suppliers played an 
active role in auto module business development: industrial service providers, auto-product centred 
suppliers and component-function centred suppliers. 
 
 
4.1. The short rush of industrial service providers in auto module business. 
 
The dynamics of industrial service provider involvement in the module business fit well with our strategic 
pattern. By its nature, in close proximity to its clients – often offering its services within their actual plants - 
  13 
the industrial service provider (Expert Component, Katoen Natie, TNT)  is therefore a typical “loyal 
partner” oriented supplier.  
 
Therefore, industrial service provider appeared naturally as early players in the module business, 
implementing involvement profile (1) and (2). Since they have no concerns about preserving their share of 
the components market beyond the structural support of their modules, they are not in conflict with the 
buying policy of manufacturers that sometimes want to choose such-and-such a panel supplier. 
Competence in assembly and just in time delivery are valuable resources for cost killing actions  in profile 
(2).  
 
When deeper involvement in redesigning the product is considered, as in profile (3) and (4), the strategy is 
simply not an option for industrial service provider, because the required competencies are so far removed 
from their chore activity. The only way to maintain in the module picture is to seek an alliance, as 
illustrated by the case of VEAS.  
 
 
4.2. The automobile-product-centred suppliers strategic track: from loyal to key partner looking for 
module externalities 
 
As for the industrial service providers, profile (1) and (2) were natural strategic move for product centred 
suppliers, already active in Supplier Parks. Their position in the value chain is already strong, therefore, 
and using architectural and integratory competence they can consolidate this position, so the challenge 
facing automobile-product-centred 1st Tier Suppliers is to preserve their position as the first choice of the 
manufacturer in a scenario of increasing delegation of responsibilities. They have developed "cost killing" 
skills as well as competence in assembly, often adapted from existing technologies devised with the 
purpose of assembling accessories on parts such as cowls or door panels, and they have strengthened their 
loyal partner strategy by offering more modularization services, since to be there when they're needed on 
the new module market obviously serves their “loyal partner” general strategy line.  
  
In implementing deep module redesign, big product-centred suppliers as Plastic Omnium, Faurecia could 
build on its competencies in the domain of general architecture of big subsystems, structural engineering 
and styling. But they rapidly encountered two types of problems. First, they prolonged their loyal partner 
strategy to a risky trap situation where they cannot value the dedicated module redesign investment through 
redeployment. Second, redesigning a module presupposes a sufficient level of competence across a 
significant range of components if these are to be redesigned right back to their shape, the way they connect 
to other components, and so forth. If it is to be successfully adopted by automobile-product-centred 1st Tier 
Suppliers, to go beyond a simple reconfiguration of components on the support piece, they will need to 
acquire an adequate knowledge of the components and systems carried by the module. Acquiring this 
knowledge may seem difficult on the internal level, with mergers of acquisition being the necessary 
solution.10 
 
To come out of the module trap, the automobile-product-centred 1st Tier Suppliers may search for 
externality effect. They can migrate from “loyal” to “key” partners by developing product centred 
competences as systems for designing styling elements, or service providers for global solution on 
functional features tightly connected to their architectural knowledge. For example a 1st Tier Suppliers that 
has traditionally produced painted cowls may move into pedestrian- or obstacle-detection systems designed 
to safeguard the vehicle against possible collision, or into. 
 
4.3. The component-functional centred suppliers’ metamorphosis to module solution providers 
 
The component and systems-centred 1st Tier Suppliers (for example Valeo, Siemens, Sysmod, JV Hella & 
Behr, JV Kansei & Calsonic), meanwhile, seeks to prosper via the excellence of its components and its 
ability to impose standards (ascending strategy). First, it files patent applications in its attempts to make 
                                                 
10 As illustrated by the recent joint venture of Plastic Omnium and Hella Behr.  
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itself a key player, and then it offers its "protected" technology to the manufacturer. The component and 
systems-centred 1st Tier Suppliers, therefore, is by nature a key partner.  
 
Profile involvement (1) was a defensive first move for functional and component specialists. They saw 
opportunity in modularization, at the outset, if it allows them to sell more components or at least to 
consolidate the market share they have already secured [Fourcade-Midler, 2004 #69] pp 13. The challenge 
of maintaining market power and therefore their Tier-1 status is an issue with greater importance for them 
that view modularization as a threat to be pushed further back along the supply chain. 
 
When accepting the module involvement challenge along with profile (1), (2) functional and component 
specialists rapidly encountered coherence problem with their initial key partner strategical position . 
- The credibility of functional and component specialists was based on their knowledge of components, but 
while the provision of modular products remained no more than a question of subcontracting assembly and 
logistics, it was difficult to turn this knowledge into value.  
 
- In profile (1) and (2), module specifications leave not much if any  room for modifications to components, 
nor do they allow the 1st Tier Suppliers to protect its share of the components market, as contending for 
modular contracts has forced them to develop new skill sets that are on the fringes of the core business of 
the function- and component-centred 1st Tier Suppliers. With so much money being consumed in the 
learning process and so few returns from this learning in terms of revenue, each new modular contract 
forced the strategic management, focused as it was on the quality of its components and systems, to 
reconsider its presence on the emerging module market. 
 
- Involvement in specialisation efforts was an opportunity to extend their product perimeter – but the 
manufacturers had their doubts. These 1st Tier Suppliers are strangers to the supplier parks; they have no 
previous experience in just-in-time delivery, no in-built knowledge of structural parts or of the processes 
for manufacturing them, and no tools for producing them. Furthermore, in open opposition to the standard 
product concept, owing not least to the "style" aspects of modules, the module market is one in which 
customization plays an ever-larger role, requiring close co-operation with the client and operating at 
extremely advanced levels of vehicle design. Functional and component specialists have no such 
relationship with their clients. Initially, with the existence of these factors, Sysmod found itself facing a 
very delicate problem: a proposal that required it to align with the product-centred 1st Tier Suppliers and 
effectively occupy a Tier-2 position, offering competence in components for module construction. Sysmod 
rejected the offer and had to employ considerable powers of persuasion to partially counter a growing trend 
in order to secure a position among the automobile-product-centred 1st Tier Suppliers, often in the form of 
contingent partnerships.  
 
On the other hand, when they succeeded in these challenges to meet profile (1) and (2) successfully, when 
the strategic ambition had been refocus at the larger level of module solution key partner, redesign 
involvement and learning externalities appears as coherent and synergic profiles. On one side, they can 
valuate they competency on many key components to propose original value adding design for the module ;  
on the other side, their knowledge of the large modular environment can be exploited in monitoring the 
road maps for the evolutions of the component portfolio. When playing this strategy, the difficulty to 
ensure that their organization supports this kind of information transfer and is not blocked by the "not 
invented here" syndrome.  
 
Conclusion: Towards new strategic coherence for module suppliers involvement in automotive 
supply chain. 
 
First initiatives from suppliers on the module business were not based on a clear vision of the answer to the 
“why?” question. Many quite different players entered the game with a “why not?” or “what if not?” 
motivation. After a while, the strategic issues of the question could not be answered :Is modular solution 
revealing itself compatible with strategic intends of such diversified business configuration such as 
industrial service providers, product-centred suppliers and component-function specialists ?  
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To answer this question, we first saw that, for suppliers, going to modular business could have a  quite 
significant  different meaning  that we characterized as four different modular involvement profiles. 
 
Then, we showed that the first two profiles (focussed on customer relation to maintain market power and 
cost reduction only on the industrial service perimeter) could easily combine with various 1st Tier suppliers 
strategic patterns. This could explain that quite different suppliers as industrial service providers, product-
centred supplier and component specialists competed in the new module market. 
 
Unfortunately, these two profiles did not generate enough value in the global value chain to maintain the 
incentives for module architectural trend. Some suppliers were financially damaged as a result of this 
learning, and the success of the notion within the manufacturer lost its intensity in the beginning of 2000.  
 
Going deeper in module redesign appeared then as a condition to maintain and develop a sustainable value 
creation model through the module concept, and thus develop the module market. At this point, only 
product-centred supplier and component specialists could address the module redesign challenges, each 
with its own specifics assets: the architectural, structural and style competencies on one side ; the precise 
knowledge of components and functions within the module on the other. As for the industrial service 
providers, they could keep up in the market only as associated in JV with the other categories.  
 
For the two  key remaining players, an involvement such as in the third modular strategy ( product-
redesign) affect the coherence of the existing strategic pattern. For the product-centred supplier, once 
driven by a loyal partner strategy, the investment in developing new important competencies, generates a 
high risk of non deployability  that did not fit  the flexibility imperative of such a strategic pattern. For the 
component centred supplier, traditionally associated with  a more autonomous key partner strategy, they 
had to accept the challenges of enlarging their scope to new architectural competencies and developing the 
product-process intimacy with their customers.  
 
This call for a renewed coherent and viable strategic model, that associate heavy involvement in module 
solution providing with external learning capacities that can diminish the non deployability trap risk. For 
component centred supplier, the value is to be find in linking component portfolio roadmaps to global 
valuable module solutions. For product-centred supplier, externalities quest leads to value competencies 
associate with their global view of module as style or pedestrian crash solution provider for example. We 
shall call it the dual module strategy, preferring the “duality” notion to “hybridation”. 
 
On this basis appears the possibility of maintaining a quite diversified offer in the general category of 
global module solution providers, joint ventures being a important tool to complement the inside resources 
if necessary. An examination of the databases for patent applications for modules support this argument. It 
shows that all companies, independently of their type, fill-in  patent applications for the total redesign of 
the module – even where some lack the skill to put the patented technology into production. This policy 
could be viewed as a way of blocking the road to competitors, forcing negotiations that will occasionally 
end up as joint-venture agreements, with one party providing the patent, the other the competence needed 
to develop the patented technology – the dual strategy is thus played out to the full. 
 
Up to now, some evidences shows that this dual model is on its way to structure the on going development 
of leaders in the automotive suppliers business. An example is the new 2010 plan of a main component 
specialist, Valéo, presented in February 2004 the firm with a new dual structuration: component business 
units and global solution provider on large domain as power train efficiency. Another is the latest joint 
venture announced at the same time by Plastic Omnium and Hella-Behr, two companies that have decided 
to pool their competence to create a new player associating a product-oriented firm and a component 
specialist. 
 
The research is now on its way to analyse the implementation of such strategic turns within automotive 
supply chain. 
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